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We explore generalizations of the pari-mutuel model (PMM), a formalization of an intui-
tive way of assessing an upper probability from a precise one. We discuss a naive extension
of the PMM considered in insurance, compare the PMMwith a related model, the Total Var-
iation Model, and generalize the natural extension of the PMM introduced by P. Walley and
other pertained formulae. The results are subsequently given a risk measurement interpre-
tation: in particular it is shown that a known risk measure, Tail Value at Risk (TVaR), is
derived from the PMM, and a coherent risk measure more general than TVaR from its
imprecise version. We analyze further the conditions for coherence of a related risk mea-
sure, Conditional Tail Expectation. Conditioning with the PMM is investigated too, comput-
ing its natural extension, characterising its dilation and studying the weaker concept of
imprecision increase.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The pari-mutuel model (PMM) formalizes a very intuitive and therefore widely used method of assigning an upper prob-
ability starting from a precise probability. To introduce it, consider, following [3], a probability P for event A as a fair price for
a bet which returns 1 unit to the bettor if A is true, 0 units if A is false, i.e. returns the indicator IA of A. The bettor’s gain is
G = IA  P(A), while that of his opponent, House, is G = GH = P(A)  IA.
In most real-world betting schemes House is unwilling to accept such a game, which is fair to both counterparts (the
expectations E(GH), E(G) are 0), but asks for a positive gain expectation. It is so when House is a bookmaker, an insurance
company, the organizer of a lottery, and so on. A way to achieve this goal is to raise the bettor’s price without altering
his reward, and a naive method multiplies P by a constant greater than 1, say 1 + d, where d > 0 is a loading constant. The
bettor pays PðAÞ ¼ ð1þ dÞPðAÞ, while the gain for House is now GH ¼ ð1þ dÞPðAÞ  IA. Alternatively, House might ask the
same price to pay a reduced reward (1  s)IA, where 0 < s < 1 is interpreted as a commission, or also a taxation. This origi-
nates a gain GH ¼ PðAÞ  ð1 sÞIA ¼ ð1 sÞ PðAÞ1s  IA
 
¼ ð1 sÞGH iff 11s ¼ 1þ d, i.e., iff s ¼ d1þd. Thus, up to a scaling factor, the
two methods are equivalent if s ¼ d1þd; the latter is formally more adherent to common betting systems, called in fact
pari-mutuel systems.1
In the theory of imprecise probabilities, P is an upper probability, but a slight adjustment to P is necessary to achieve the
customarily adopted consistency notion of coherence, recalled in Section 2. In fact, Walley [16] terms pari-mutuel model the
upper probabilityPðAÞ ¼minfð1þ dÞPðAÞ;1g: ð1Þ. All rights reserved.
ax: +39 040 54209.
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matter whether A is true or false.
This paper investigates further the pari-mutuel model, extending the analyses in [13,16]. Preliminary issues are recalled
in Section 2, very concisely in general, more extensively as for 2-monotone and 2-alternating previsions, since the upper
probability P in (1) is 2-alternating. In Section 3, we discuss extensions of the PMM and compare it with a similar model.
First, we consider alternative expressions for the natural extension EðXÞ of P, deﬁned on a ﬁeld A, to any A-measurable gam-
ble X. These expressions were stated in [16], but we make a more detailed analysis of the conditions ensuring that EðXÞ is
equal to a certain conditional prevision (P(X|X > xs)), which has a risk measurement interpretation. In Section 3.1, we restrict
to non-negative gambles and compare the natural extension E with the naive extension PNðXÞ ¼minfð1þ dÞPðXÞ; supXg,
showing that quite often PN is not coherent. The motivation for this work is that PN is a premium in insurance, although with
different premises: the starting point is not the PMM but a set of non-negative gambles. In Section 3.2, we compare the PMM
with the Total Variation Model (TVM) [8] and compute the natural extension of the TVM to A-measurable gambles. In Sec-
tion 3.3, we generalize Walley’s approach, obtaining a formula for EðXÞ when the PMM is given on a lattice of events and X is
not necessarily measurable: this makes it possible to evaluate EðXÞ for all X deﬁned on a suitable reference partition while
assessing a probability on a relatively small set of events (this and other concepts are illustrated in Example 2).
These results have an interesting and, to the best of our knowledge, so far not considered interpretation in the realm of
risk measurement. This is the main topic of Section 4, where the natural extension of the PMM deﬁned on a ﬁeld is shown to
correspond to a coherent risk measure, called Tail Value-at-Risk or TVaR (in [5]; other authors may use a different terminol-
ogy). When the PMM is deﬁned on a lattice, we obtain a generalization of TVaR (not discussed in the risk literature), which
replaces precise with imprecise uncertainty measures; we name it ITVaR. Thus the PMM supplies a motivation for introduc-
ing ‘imprecise’ risk measures: one of them, ITVaR, is the natural extension of a PMM assigned on a lattice. Conditioning the
PMM deﬁned on a ﬁeld is discussed in Section 5. We specialize general formulae for the natural extension of 2-alternating
and 2-monotone probabilities to the case of the PMM and explore the effect on them of dilation and of a weaker phenom-
enon, imprecision increase. We characterise dilation and give sufﬁcient conditions for dilation or imprecision increase in Sec-
tion 5.1. Further, operational conditions for the most relevant cases (when the commission s is ‘low’ or event A is ‘rare’) are
given in Section 5.2. Ideas about varying the extent of dilation or imprecision increase are outlined in Section 5.3. Section 6
concludes the paper. The proofs of the main results are given in the Appendix.
2. Preliminaries
Upper (P) and lower (P) probabilities are customarily related by the conjugacy relation PðAÞ ¼ 1 PðAcÞ, which lets one
refer to either P or P only. Applying it to (1), the lower probability in the PMM is [16]PðAÞ ¼maxfð1þ dÞPðAÞ  d;0g: ð2Þ
As noted in Section 1, the parameter s 2 ]0;1[ can, and later will, alternatively describe P; P in the PMM. We shall often ex-
ploit, without always recalling it, the relationship between s and d:s ¼ d
1þ d ; d ¼
s
1 s : ð3ÞAn upper probability P deﬁned by (1) for any A in an arbitrary set of events D (or P deﬁned by (2)) is coherent on D, and prob-
ably the simplest way to see it is to apply our subsequent Proposition 2. In general, an upper prevision P is a mapping from a
set D of gambles (bounded random variables), deﬁned on a partition or possibility space Pu, into the real line, and an upper
probability is its special case that the domain D is made of (indicators of) events only.
The upper prevision P is coherent on D iff, 8n 2 N, "s0,s1, . . . ,snP 0, 8X0;X1; . . . ;Xn 2 D, deﬁning G ¼Pni¼1siðPðXiÞ  XiÞ
s0ðPðX0Þ  X0Þ, it holds that supGP 0.
There are several necessary conditions for coherence, in particular: internality, inf X 6 PðXÞ 6 supX, and subadditivity,
PðX þ YÞ 6 PðXÞ þ PðYÞ.
We refer to [16] for a thorough presentation of the theory of coherent upper and lower previsions. One of its most impor-
tant notions is that of natural extension [16, Section 3].
In our framework, the natural extension E on D0 of a coherent upper prevision (or probability) P deﬁned on D  D0 is the
least-committal coherent extension of P on D0, i.e., EðXÞ ¼ PðXÞ, 8X 2 D, and for any coherent P such that P ¼ P on D,
EðXÞP PðXÞ, 8X 2 D0, i.e., E dominates P. It can be shown that E always exists. Symmetrically, the natural extension E on
D0L of a coherent lower prevision P on DL is such that E = P (on DL), and every coherent extension P* of P dominates E on D0L.
If condition ‘"s0,s1, . . . ,snP 0’ is replaced by ‘8s0; s1; . . . ; sn 2 R’ in the deﬁnition of coherent upper prevision, we obtain de
Finetti’s notion of dF-coherent (precise) prevision [3]. A dF-coherent prevision P is coherent both as an upper and as a lower
prevision. Moreover, a dF-coherent prevision corresponds to the expectation with respect to a ﬁnitely additive probability.
The precise previsions or probabilities in the sequel are meant to be dF-coherent.
Although the domain of an upper prevision may be arbitrary, it will have a special structure in most of the paper, to ex-
ploit results on 2-alternating previsions.
More speciﬁcally, a set of events A is a ﬁeld when ; 2 A and A _ B;Ac 2 A;8A;B 2 A. If A is a ﬁeld, a gamble X is A-mea-
surable when the events X > x and X < x are in A, 8x 2 R.
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min (X,Y)(x) = min(X(x),Y(x)), 8x 2 Pu.
An upper prevision P deﬁned on a lattice S is called 2-alternating iff PðmaxðX;YÞÞ 6 PðXÞ þ PðYÞ  PðminðX;YÞÞ, "X,Y 2 S. A
lower prevision P on S is 2-monotone iff P(max(X,Y))P P(X) + P(Y)  P(min(X,Y)), "X,Y 2 S.
Results stated for 2-monotone previsions are easily reworded for 2-alternating ones (and vice versa), since the conjugate
PðXÞ ¼ PðXÞ of a 2-monotone lower prevision is 2-alternating (and vice versa).
When S is a set of (indicators of) events and P is therefore an upper probability, S is a lattice iff A, B 2 S implies A _ B 2 S,
A ^ B 2 S, and P is 2-alternating iff PðA _ BÞ 6 PðAÞ þ PðBÞ  PðA ^ BÞ, "A,B 2 S. Let S+ be a lattice of events containing the impos-
sible event ; and the sure event X. With a mild additional condition, 2-alternating upper probabilities are coherent on S+ [2]:
Proposition 1. Let P be a 2-alternating upper probability on S+. Then P is coherent iff Pð;Þ ¼ 0 and PðXÞ ¼ 1.
One way to obtain coherent 2-alternating upper probabilities deﬁnes P as a special distorted probability, by the following
result, adapted from [4, Example 2.1].
Proposition 2. Let P be a dF-coherent probability on S+ and / a (weakly) increasing concave function deﬁned on [0;1] with
/(0) = 0, /(1) = 1. Then the distorted probability PðÞ ¼ /ðPðÞÞ is a 2-alternating and coherent upper probability.
Proposition 2 ensures that P in (1) is 2-alternating and coherent (put /(x) = min((1 + d)x,1)), hence its conjugate P is 2-
monotone and coherent.
To deal with the natural extension of the PMM in Section 3, the following Proposition 3 will be exploited.
Notation. The natural extension of interest is that of P from S+ to the set L ¼ LðPuÞ of all gambles deﬁned on a ‘universal’
partition Pu (termed X in [16]). That is, Pu is a set of pairwise disjoint events, whose sum is the sure event X, and such that
its powerset 2Pu contains all the events of interest. In particular Sþ#2Pu . Given P : Sþ ! R, its outer (set) function P is deﬁned
on 2Pu by PðBÞ ¼ inffPðAÞ : A 2 Sþ;B ) Ag, 8B 2 2Pu .
Two gambles X,Y are comonotonic iff X(x1) < X(x2) implies Y(x1) 6 Y(x2), 8x1;x2 2 Pu. An upper prevision P is comono-
tonic additive iff PðX þ YÞ ¼ PðXÞ þ PðYÞ for all comonotonic X, Y in its domain.
Proposition 3. [2] Let P : Sþ ! R be a coherent 2-alternating upper probability. Its natural extension E on L is given byEðXÞ ¼ inf X þ
Z supX
inf X
PðX > xÞdx ð4Þand is 2-alternating too. Further,
(a) The restriction of E on 2Pu coincides with the outer function P.
(b) If Sþ ¼ 2Pu ; E is the only 2-alternating, or equivalently the only comonotonic additive, coherent extension of P on L.
In Section 5, we shall be concerned with natural extensions on conditional events, like EðAjBÞ or E(A|B), while precise con-
ditional previsions, like P(X|X > xs), appear in Section 3. In a conditional environment, the symbol D already introduced de-
notes more generally an arbitrary set of conditional gambles, i.e., its generic element is X|B, where X is a gamble and B a non-
impossible event (when in particular B =X, X|B = X|X = X).
Although the paper presentation does not focus on coherence concepts in a conditional environment, our approach em-
ploys formally Williams coherence or W-coherence, in the version presented in [11, Deﬁnition 4], reported here:
Deﬁnition 1. P : D ! R is a W-coherent conditional lower prevision on D iff, for all n 2 N, 8X0jB0; . . . ;XnjBn 2 D, " s0,s1, . . . ,sn
real and non-negative, deﬁning B ¼ Wni¼0Bi and G ¼Pni¼1siIBi ðXi  PðXijBiÞÞ  s0IB0 ðX0  PðX0jB0ÞÞ, it holds that sup (G|B)P 0.
The term gi ¼ siIBi ðXi  PðXijBiÞÞ (i = 0,1, . . . ,n) is interpreted as the gain from a conditional bet on Xi with stake si. In fact, gi
is obtained from the condition that the gambler’s bet siP(Xi|Bi) is called off iff Bi is false (in such a case gi = 0), otherwise the
gambler receives (if i = 1, . . . ,n) or pays (if i = 0) siIBiXi ¼ siXi, and consequently gi = si(Xi  P(Xi|Bi)). Recall further that
sup (G|B) = sup{G(x):x) B}.
W-coherence reduces to the customary notion of coherence in [16] in the unconditional case, or to Walley’s coherence in
[16, Section 7.1.4 (b)] when – and this is the case in the present paper – ﬁnitely many conditional events are involved (and
some structure is imposed on D [11]).
Thus, the results in thepapermaybeequivalently interpreted intermsof thecoherenceconcepts in [16].Amotivation forusing
W-coherence is that, since it requires no structure constraints onD and allows for rather general envelope and natural extension
theorems also in a conditional framework, our results could bemore simply extended to general conditional frameworks, where
W-coherence is not necessarily equivalent to Walley’s approach (cf. [16] for further comparisons of coherence concepts).
Several necessary conditions hold for W-coherence, whenever they are well deﬁned. Recall internality, infðXjBÞ 6 PðXjBÞ 6
supðXjBÞ, and the Generalized Bayes Rule (GBR) PðIAðX  PðXjAÞÞÞ ¼ 0, which in the case of precise previsions specialises toPðXIAÞ ¼ PðXjAÞPðAÞ: ð5Þ
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The natural extension E of PðAÞ ¼minfð1þ dÞPðAÞ;1g from a ﬁeld A to any A-measurable gamble X was shown in [16] to
be2 Eq.
3 WeEðXÞ ¼ xs þ ð1þ dÞP ðX  xsÞþ
 
; ð6Þ
where (X  xs)+ = max{X  xs,0} and the (upper) quantile xs is deﬁned asxs ¼ supfx 2 R : PðX 6 xÞ 6 sg ¼ supfx 2 R : PðX > xÞP 1 sg: ð7Þ
As appears from (7), xs is a quantile function, a well-known concept in the literature for deﬁning an inverse for the distribu-
tion function FXðxÞ ¼def PðX 6 xÞ. There are however slightly different ways of deﬁning quantiles (see [4, Section 1.5.8]); ours
follows [16, Section 3.2.5]. The upper quantile xs can be viewed as a threshold such that, for every x > xs, X exceeds x with
probability less than 1  s (see also Example 1).
An alternative expression for EðXÞ is:2EðXÞ ¼ ð1 eÞPðXjX > xsÞ þ exs; e ¼def 1 ð1þ dÞPðX > xsÞ: ð8Þ
It is also stated in [16] that EðXÞ ¼ PðXjX > xsÞ if X has a continuous distribution function FX(x).
We shall now explore more thoroughly the relationship between EðXÞ and P(X|X > xs). The results will be exploited also in
Section 4, where they will be reinterpreted in a risk measurement perspective.
To begin with, we gather some known or anyway elementary, but useful facts in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let X be A-measurable and for s 2 ]0;1[ deﬁne: xs by (7), FX xþs
  ¼ limx!xþs FXðxÞ, FX xs  ¼ limx!xs FXðxÞ.
ðaÞ s 2 FX xs
 
; FX xþs
  
; besides, all values of s in ½FX xs
 
; FX xþs
 ½ originate by (7) the same (upper) quantile xs.
ðbÞ inf X 6 xs 6 sup X.
ðcÞ (X > xs) = ; iff xs = sup X; if (X 6 xs) = ; then xs = inf X.
ðdÞ It holds for e in (8) that e Q 0 iff s R FX(xs).3Corollary 1. If (X > xs) = ;, EðXÞ ¼ supX.Proof. Substitute (by Proposition 4 (c)) xs = sup X in (6), noting that P((X  xs)+) = P(0) = 0. hRemark 1. When P is r-additive, FX xþs
  ¼ FXðxsÞ, i.e., FX is right-continuous. But an often neglected issue broadens the num-
ber of possible alternatives in comparing EðXÞwith P(X|X > xs) (and with another extension presented in the next Section 3.1):
since FX is originated by a not necessarily r-additive probability P, there may exist non-zero adherent probabilities at xs (cf. [3,
Section 6.4.11]; see also [9]). Precisely,FX xþs
  FX xs  ¼ Pxs þ Pþxs þ PðX ¼ xsÞ;where Pxs ¼ FXðxsÞ  FX xs
  PðX ¼ xsÞ is the left adherent probability at xs, Pþxs ¼ FX xþs  FXðxsÞ is the right adherent prob-
ability at xs. Hence,FXðxsÞ ¼ FX xs
 þ Pxs þ PðX ¼ xsÞ: ð9ÞWhile Pþxs is zero iff FX is right-continuous at xs (always if P is r-additive), from (9), FX may be left-discontinuous in xs also
when Pxs ¼ 0, if P(X = xs) > 0 (r-additivity of P implies Pxs ¼ 0).Proposition 5
ðaÞ If P(X|X > xs) = xs, then EðXÞ ¼ PðXjX > xsÞ.
ðbÞ If P(X|X > xs) > xs, then EðXÞQPðXjX > xsÞ iff s Q FX(xs).Proof. Using (8), EðXÞQPðXjX > xsÞ iff e(xs  P(X|X > xs)) Q 0, fromwhich (a) follows immediately, (b) using also Proposition 4
(d). h(8) is stated without proof in [16], note 3 to Section 3.2. A proof may be deduced from the later Proposition 8; see also the comments made there.
write Q or R to summarize three conditions, here e < 0 iff s > FX(xs), e= 0 iff s = FX(xs), e> 0 iff s < FX(xs).
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the comparison between EðXÞ and P(X|X > xs) to comparing s and FX(xs) in the further subcases that can be identiﬁed. The
most notable instances are:
(i) FX is continuous at xs. This implies s = FX(xs), and EðXÞ ¼ PðXjX > xsÞ.
(ii) FX is right-continuous, but not continuous at xs, and s– FX(xs). This implies FXðxsÞ ¼ FX xþs
 
> s, and
PðXjX > xsÞ > EðXÞ.
Case (ii) is the most obvious instance that ensures PðXjX > xsÞ > EðXÞ, but not the only one. By Proposition 4 (a), it can be
s < FX(xs) also when FX is not right-continuous (while being left-discontinuous). Similarly, there are other cases when
PðXjX > xsÞ ¼ EðXÞ because s = FX(xs), apart from case (i), which remains the most important one. And it is also possible that
(iii) PðXjX > xsÞ < EðXÞ.
Obviously, case (iii) cannot occur when P is r-additive, since it is equivalent to s > FX(xs), hence to s 2FXðxsÞ; FX xþs
  ¼ I>
and I>–£ iff Pþxs > 0.
When PðXjX > xsÞ > EðXÞ, then P(X | X > xs) is clearly not a coherent extension to X of P in the PMM, while it is so when it
coincides with EðXÞ.
3.1. Comparison with a naive extension
In actuarial applications the upper probability PðAÞ in (1) is the price, determined by increasing P by a loading d > 0, of an
insurance policy which pays 1 unit if and only if event A occurs. In analogy with (1), one could set the price of an insurance
policy which refunds x units iff the loss X = x occurs, to (1 + d)P(X), up to a maximum of sup X. Here P(X) is usually the expec-
tation of X computed from P. This procedure deﬁnes the naive extension:PNðXÞ ¼minfð1þ dÞPðXÞ; supXg:
It is important to discuss this extension both because it represents the intuitively simplest way to apply the PMM to gambles,
and because it has been actually considered in risk theory. Precisely, only the multiplicative term PNðXÞ ¼ ð1þ dÞPðXÞ is em-
ployed, and referred to as expected value principle, in risk theory literature [7, p. 67], but we shall rather investigate PN , since
the upper bound sup X is easily seen to be necessary for coherence. To ﬁx the framework, suppose (throughout this section
only) that P is deﬁned on the ﬁeld 2Pu , and that we are interested in extending it to some set D strictly contained in the cone
LþðPuÞ of the non-negative gambles in LðPuÞ. Here we assume that the gambles in D are non-negative, bearing in mind the
insurance framework PN is applied to: each X 2 D is a refund to the insured, hence inf XP 0, 8X 2 D.
The inclusion D$LþðPuÞ is strict because PN cannot in general be coherent on a set D containing X, X + k, when k 2 Rþ is
large enough. For instance, if PNðXÞ ¼ ð1þ dÞPðXÞ < supX, then for kP supXð1þdÞPðXÞd , it holds that PNðX þ kÞ ¼ supX þ k >
PNðXÞ þ k, violating property (c) in [16, Section 2.6.1], which is a necessary condition for coherence.
The above argument points clearly out that PN is not coherentwhen its domainD is sufﬁciently rich. Yet, PN maybe coherent
on some very special set (for instance, D ¼ fXg) if, as usually done in insurance, the starting point for getting PN is a set of
gambles, and not the PMM. At a closer look, this is true when we only assess a prevision to compute PN , without preliminarily
assigning a probability P on 2Pu , such that P(X) is the expectation of X under P (for instance, when D ¼ fXg we may assess
P(X) 2 [inf X;sup X] without eliciting any probability for events like X = x, or X 6 x). In the more customary case that P(X) is
an expectation, since thePMMisalsodeterminedby theprobabilityPwemayalways thinkof PN as anextensionof thePMM.Here
PN may be incoherent with the PMM, even when PN is deﬁned on very simple sets likeD ¼ fXg, as the next example shows:
Example 1. Take Pu ¼ fx0;x1;x2;x3g, and let X(xi) = i (i = 0, . . . ,3), P(X = 0) = 0, P(X = 1) = 0.1, P(X = 2) = 0.5, P(X = 3) = 0.4
and d = 1/10. Then P(X) = 2.3 and hence PNðXÞ ¼ 2:53. Let us now compute the natural extension in X. We have that
s ¼ d1þd ¼ 1=11, hence xs = 1, as can be checked using FX. Applying (6), EðXÞ ¼ 1þ 1110 PðmaxfX  1;0gÞ ¼ 1þ 1110 1:3 ¼ 2:43.
In Example 1, PNðXÞ > EðXÞ. This is interesting because the natural extension is shown to lead to a price smaller than
would be expected from the intuition at the basis of the PMM and also because PN is incoherent with the PMM, being larger
than E.
The dominance relationship between PN and E is analyzed in detail in [13, Proposition 6]. It ensues from there that PN is
only occasionally and in quite special situations equal to E. For instance, if FX is continuous at xs PN is incoherent, unless the
limiting evaluation P(X|X 6 xs) = 0 (6inf X) applies.
As a ﬁnal remark, we note that PN is generally incoherent even when the assumption XP 0, 8X 2 D, is removed. For in-
stance, when X < 0, it is PNðXÞ ¼ ð1þ dÞPðXÞ < inf X if PðXÞ < inf X1þd .
3.2. Comparison with the Total Variation Model
While the naive extension PN in Section 3.1 is directly inspired by the basic idea underlying the PMM, the Total Variation
Model (TVM) may be introduced independently of the PMM [8], but functionally, as we shall see, is closely related to it. This
motivates the investigation in this section.
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M¼ fQ : qðP;QÞ ¼def supA2AjPðAÞ  QðAÞj 6 s;Q dF-coherent probability on Ag. The term q(P,Q) is a total variation distance,
and this names the model. So the TVM formalizes an imprecise knowledge of a precise probability P: the ‘true’ probability
may be any of those in M.
If the following assumption is made
(a) P(A) > 0, 8A 2 A f;g,
the lower envelope of M, i.e. PTVMðAÞ ¼ infQ2MfQðAÞg, 8A 2 A, is
PTVMðAÞ ¼ maxfPðAÞ  s;0g; 8A 2 A fXg; ð10Þwhile PTVM(X) = 1.
It is then easy to derive PTVMðAÞ ¼ 1 PTVMðAcÞ, gettingPTVMðAÞ ¼ minfPðAÞ þ s;1g; 8A 2 A f;g; ð11Þ
while PTVMð;Þ ¼ 0.
By Proposition 2, PTVM is a coherent, 2-alternating upper probability.
We emphasize that (10) and (11) are obtained under assumption (a), which is rather restrictive: in the common case that
A ¼ 2Pu ;Pu must be countable. This is a difference with the PMM, whose probabilities (1) and (2) need not comply with (a).
When assumption (a) applies, we may use (2) and (3) to getPðAÞ ¼ ð1þ dÞmaxfPðAÞ  s;0g ¼ 1
1 s PTVMðAÞ; ð12Þwhich holds iff A–X. Analogously, PðAÞ ¼ ð1þ dÞmin PðAÞ; 11þd
n o
¼ 11s minfPðAÞ;1 sg ¼ 11s ðminfPðAÞ þ s;1g  sÞ. HencePðAÞ ¼ 1
1 s ðPTVMðAÞ  sÞ; A– ;: ð13ÞThus Eqs. (12) and (13) explicit the relationship between PMM and TVM, when both are obtained from the same probability P.
The natural extension ETVM of the TVM on any A-measurable gamble is obtained using previous results: from (13)
PTVMðAÞ ¼ ð1 sÞPðAÞ þ s, and using (4)ETVMðXÞ ¼ inf X þ
Z supX
inf X
½ð1 sÞPðX > xÞ þ sdx ¼ inf X þ ð1 sÞ
Z supX
inf X
PðX > xÞdxþ sðsupX  inf XÞ:Since (cf. [16, Section 3.2.3])Z supX
inf X
PðX > xÞdx ¼ xs þ 11 s PððX  xsÞ
þÞ  inf X;we obtainETVMðXÞ ¼ xs þ P ðX  xsÞþ
 þ sðsupX  xsÞ: ð14ÞAlthough the relationshipbetweenPMMandTVMis functionally simple, not all the results concerningonemodel havea com-
parably simple counterpartwithin the other one. This is especially truewhenconditioning, cf. Section5 for PMMand [8] for TVM.
3.3. A generalization
We shall derive here E in the more general framework of Proposition 3, that P is deﬁned by the PMM on S+ and E on LðPuÞ.
We ﬁrst obtain an expression for EðBÞ, for any event B in 2Pu .
Proposition 6. In the PMM, the natural extension of P : Sþ ! R on 2Pu isEðBÞ ¼minfð1þ dÞePðBÞ;1g; ð15Þ
where the upper probability ePðBÞ ¼ inffPðAÞ : A 2 Sþ;B ) Ag is the outer function of P.
We emphasize that eP in (15) is generally not a precise, but an upper probability. In fact, by Proposition 3 (a), it coincides
with the natural extension EP on 2
Pu of the probability P, when P is interpreted as a special upper probability. As such, and
since P is obviously n-alternating, eP is n-alternating too (see [2]).
Proposition 7. In the PMM, the natural extension of P : Sþ ! R on LðPuÞ is, 8 X 2 LðPuÞ:EðXÞ ¼ xus þ ð1þ dÞEP X  xus
 þ  ð16Þwhere EP is the natural extension of P (also of ePÞ on L, and xus is the (upper) quantile relative to eP
4 Wh
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Clearly, (16) generalizes (6). We might summarize the difference between the natural extension in (16) and that in (6) as
follows: computing the natural extension of P on gambles which are not necessarily measurable with respect to the domain
of P introduces imprecision by transforming the precise prevision P((X  xs)+) in (6) into the upper prevision EP

X  xus
 þ in
(16). Also the quantile xs refers to probability P in (7), while xus employs the upper probability eP in (17).
But there is another attractive interpretation: EðBÞ in (15) can be viewed as a kind of imprecise PMM, deﬁned via natural
extension on 2Pu starting from a (precise) PMM on a narrower set S+: then (16) describes the natural extension of this impre-
cise model.
Some properties of the natural extension of the PMM generalize to the natural extension of the imprecise PMM. The fol-
lowing proposition relaxes (8):
Proposition 8. If ðX > xusÞ– ;, it holds for the natural extension E on LðPuÞ of P : Sþ ! R thatEðXÞ 6 euxus þ ð1 euÞEP XjX > xus
 
; ð18Þ
where eu ¼def 1 ð1þ dÞEP X > xus
 
.
Although the inequality in (18) can be strict (we omit proving this), when P and hence P are deﬁned on 2Pu then EP is equal
to P (or to its extension using (5)), and xus , e
u to xs, e, respectively. Since P is additive (and considered the proof of Proposition
8 given in Appendix A) we get now EP ðX  xsÞþ
  ¼ P ðX  xsÞþ  ¼ k. Thus (18) reduces to (8).
The statement corresponding to Proposition 4 (d) is eu R 0 iff EP X > xus
 
Q 11þd, or also euR0 iff EP X 6 xus
 
Rs.
We know that e = 0 when FX is continuous at xs. An analogous relationship associates eu and FX. In fact, when
FXðxÞ ¼ EPðX 6 xÞ ¼ 1 EPðX > xÞ is continuous at xus , then EP X > xus
  ¼ 1 s. Hence eu = 1  (1 + d)(1  s) = 0.
4. Risk measurement interpretations
If Y is a gamble, it is known [10] that PðYÞmay be interpreted as a risk measure for Y, i.e., a number measuring how risky
Y is, or also the amount of money to be reserved to cover potential losses from Y. Several risk measures were introduced in
the literature, and there is often no unanimity on the terminology. To ensure comparisons with [5], we shall refer the risk
measure to X = Y; this corresponds, when Y 6 0, to thinking in terms of losses and is frequently done in insurance, where X
represents the amount to be paid for insurance claims (however, X is not necessarily non-negative in what follows).4 Thus the
upper previsions EðXÞ in (6), (8) and (16) may be seen as risk measures for X, and there is a strong correspondence with mea-
sures studied in the literature.
Consider Eq. (6): xs is the Value-at-Risk of X at level s, VaRs(X), while P((X  xs)+) is the expected shortfall ESs(X) (whenever
P is replaced by or thought of as an expectation) [5]. In fact, (X  xs)+ measures the shortfall, i.e., the residual loss in absolute
value of an agent who reserves an amount of money equal to VaRs(X) = xs to cover losses from X. Also P(X|X > xs) corresponds
to a well-known risk measure (when P is an expectation), termed Conditional Tail Expectation (CTEs) in [5].
Eq. (6) corresponds to (2.7) in [5], which deﬁnes another measure of risk, TailVaRs(X) or TVaRs(X). This equation is iden-
tical to (6), after replacing E, xs, P((X  xs)+) with, respectively, TVaRs(X), VaRs(X), ESs(X):TVaRsðXÞ ¼ VaRsðXÞ þ ð1þ dÞESsðXÞ:
Analogously, Eq. (8) corresponds toTVaRsðXÞ ¼ ð1 eÞCTEsðXÞ þ eVaRsðXÞ: ð19Þ
The novel fact in our approach (apart from using previsions instead of expectations) is that TVaRs is derived as the natural
extension of the PMM, while the starting point in the literature for deﬁning this or other measures is usually a set of random
variables, often a linear space equipped with a r-additive probability measure, which is used to compute the expectations. In
our notation, the usual approach would make the initial uncertainty assessments on the gambles deﬁned on Pu rather than
on the events in 2Pu . Recalling also Proposition 3, we deduce the following properties for TVaRs.
Proposition 9. TVaRs(X) is the natural extension on LðPuÞ of the PMM deﬁned on 2Pu . Hence, it is the least-committal risk
measure extending the PMM which is coherent. Actually, it is its only coherent extension which is 2-alternating, or equivalently
comonotonic additive.
CTEs complements VaRs, in the sense that VaRs, unlike CTEs, is nearly uninformative about what are the losses, should the
threshold xs be exceeded. Unfortunately, neither VaRs nor CTEs is generally coherent, even though their linear combination in
(19) originates a coherent risk measure. Conditions for coherence of CTEs are discussed in Section 3, and are commoner inile ensuring compatibility with the prevailing literature and the formulae in [16], the convention of referring to losses modiﬁes the range of the typical
or s. In this section s should be fairly close to 1, representing the probability that the loss is not too high, while in the rest of the paper should rather be
0, being a taxation or commission.
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comparison between CTEs and TVaRs is limited to cases (i) and (ii) in Section 3 which, as we pointed out there, are not exhaus-
tive in general. Comonotonic additivity of TVaRs is also an interesting and sometimes required property in risk measurement [5].
The reason is that the risk of the sum q(X + Y) is generally less than the sum of the single risks for X and Y, because of a diver-
siﬁcation effect; however, this effect is much weaker, making the equality q(X + Y) = q(X) + q(Y) an often acceptable approxima-
tion, when X and Y tend to vary in the same direction, i.e., are comonotonic.
The generalization in Section 3.3 forms a basis for further results on the risk measurement side. This time, EðXÞ in (16) is
the natural extension of the PMM deﬁned on S+( 2Pu ), and may again be interpreted as a risk measure, let us name it Impre-
cise TailVar or ITVaRs. Using Proposition 3, ITVaRs is coherent and also 2-alternating. However, ITVaRs has no analogue in the
risk measurement literature. The reason lies in the standard habit of deﬁning risk measures from an underlying precise prob-
ability, an established customwhich rules out potentially interesting risk measures that are functions of imprecise measures.
And looking at (16), we notice that ITVaRs is a linear combination of other twomeasures which are imprecise versions of VaRs
and ESs: xus is deﬁned in (17) as a function of the upper probability eP, the shortfall X  xus þ is evaluated by the upper pre-
vision EP .
We may conclude that the PMM provides also a formal justiﬁcation for the existence of a new kind of risk measures, those
deﬁned in terms of imprecise uncertainty measures. This topic is still largely not investigated; an exception is the general-
ization of Dutch risk measures introduced in [1].
Finally, note that the natural extension ETVM of the TVM in Eq. (14) provides us with another 2-alternating (and comono-
tonic additive) coherent risk measure, let us call it TVRMs (Total Variation risk measure). Its expression is5 ForTVRMsðXÞ ¼ VaRsðXÞ þ ESsðXÞ þ sðsupX  xsÞ:
We are not aware whether TVRMs has been previously employed in the relevant literature, seemingly not, but similarly to
TVaRs it can be viewed as the least-committal coherent risk measure which extends the TVM deﬁned on 2
Pu .
To conclude this section, we present a simple example illustrating several of the concepts discussed so far.
Example 2. Let Pu ¼ Rþ denote the set of possible outcomes of a certain stock index Y on a given day. For allx 2 Pu, deﬁne X
on Pu byXðxÞ ¼
y1 if x 6 y1
y2 if xP y2
x otherwise;
8><>:
where 0 < y1 < y2. We regard X as the return of an investment certiﬁcate with equity protection: X replicates Y within some
chosen bounds, a ﬂoor y1 and a cap y2.
We would like to sell X at price p, with y1 < p < y2, thus making a proﬁt p  X. We aim at calculating a risk measure for the
proﬁt, by calculating the upper prevision of the potential loss X  p. We consider a threshold t, with p < t < y2, such that XP t
is deemed to lead to a critical loss.
We will calculate the upper prevision of X  p as the natural extension of a PMM deﬁned on a lattice, which means that
the risk measure will be ITVaRs. To this end, we ﬁrst consider some events that are important for assessing the risk:
 E1 is deﬁned as the event ‘X 6 p’; it corresponds to having a gain (in the limit zero, if X = p);
 Ec1, the complement of E1, obviously means that there is a loss;
 E2 = ‘XP t’ corresponds to experiencing a critical loss.
The minimum lattice that includes the three events above is Sþ ¼ fE1; Ec1; E2, E1 _ E2, ;, X} (note that E1 ^ E2 = ;). We assess a
probability P on this lattice, to compute EðX  pÞ ¼ EðXÞ  p using Proposition 7.
Now we have to ﬁx s 2 ]0;1[. We choose s so that P(E1) 6 s < 1  P(E2). The rationale is the following. Remember that the
meaning of s is that of a threshold (cf. Footnote 4): the probability of not experiencing a critical loss must be larger than s.
Using the introduced events, this means that s < 1  P(E2). On the other hand, if it was the case that P(E1) > s, recalling that s
is a number close to 1, that would correspond to requiring an unrealistically high probability of making a gain.
We may conveniently apply the following formula (cf. (30) in the proof of Proposition 7) to obtain EðXÞ:EðXÞ ¼ xus þ
1
1 s
Z supX
xus
ePðX > xÞdx; ð20Þ
where xus and eP are deﬁned in (17) and Proposition 6, respectively.
Let us calculate xus .
 If x < p, then the event ‘X > x’ implies only the element X of S+, and hence ePðX > xÞ ¼ 1.
 If p 6 x < t, then the elements in S+ implied by ‘X > x’ are Ec1 and X, and hence ePðX > xÞ ¼ P Ec1 .VaRs, see the discussion in [10].
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 If xP y2, then the event ‘X > x’ is ;, and hence ePðX > xÞ ¼ 0.
Recalling that P(E1) 6 s < 1  P(E2), we obtain that xus ¼ t. Now, using (20)EðX  pÞ ¼ ðt  pÞ þ PðE2Þ
1 s ðy2  tÞ:This means that the amount of money to be reserved is made of a ﬁxed term (t  p) to cover non-critical losses, plus a term to
cover the critical part of the loss, which for a given s is proportional to the probability of experiencing a critical loss.
As the reader can easily verify, extending P on the ﬁeld (and lattice) Sþ [ Ec2
 	
and modifying the PMM accordingly does
not change the value of EðX  pÞ, since Ec2 is not implied by any event ‘X > x’ when x < y2.
It is worth noting that the less general formula (6) [16] cannot be applied in Example 2 when P is assessed only on S+ or
even on Sþ [ Ec2
 	
, as it requires P to be deﬁned on a much larger domain, (at least) the smallest ﬁeld containing the events
‘X > x’ and ‘X < x’, x 2 [y1;y2]. This highlights an operationally important feature of the generalization of the PMM introduced
in Section 3.3: it supplies us with uncertainty evaluations for gambles which are not necessarily measurable with respect to
the set of events the PMM is deﬁned on. This set must be a lattice (like S+). In particular it may also be a ﬁeld (like Sþ [ Ec2
 	
),
but could be considerably smaller than the minimal ﬁeld meeting the measurability requirements underlying (6). This is a
quite useful fact when eliciting too many beliefs may be hard, or somewhat arbitrary.
5. Conditioning the pari-mutuel model
Reconsider the basic PMM, with PðAÞ; PðAÞ given by (1), (2), A 2 D, and D is now a ﬁeld of events. We shall compute the
natural extensions EðAjBÞ, E(A|B) of P and P on A|B, with B 2 D, B– ;. Since P and P are, respectively, 2-alternating and 2-
monotone, from a well-known result ([15, Theorem 7.2]; see also [12]), when P(B) > 0:EðAjBÞ ¼ PðA ^ BÞ
PðA ^ BÞ þ PðAc ^ BÞ ;
EðAjBÞ ¼ PðA ^ BÞ
PðA ^ BÞ þ PðAc ^ BÞ :
ð21ÞWhen P(B) = 0, Eq. (21) do not apply, but it can be shown (directly, usingWilliams coherence, or alternatively from results
in [16]) that
Lemma 1. Given a coherent lower probability P on a set D of (unconditional) events, let B 2 D, P(B) = 0. The natural extension E of
P on D [ fA1jB; . . . ;AnjBg is E(Ai|B) = 1 if B) Ai, E(Ai|B) = 0 otherwise, for i = 1, . . . ,n.
Applying Lemma 1 for n = 2, A1 = A, A2 = Ac and using conjugacy, it follows that, when P(B) = 0 in the PMM, then E(A|B) = 0,
"A such that B; A, and EðAjBÞ ¼ 1, "A such that A ^ B– ;.
We assume in the sequel P(B) > 0; note that by (2) P(B) > 0 iff PðBÞ > ddþ1 ¼ s. Further, P(B) > 0 ensures that the denomina-
tors in (21) are non-zero. Take EðAjBÞ: using property 2.7.4 (d) in [16], PðA ^ BÞ þ PðAc ^ BÞP PðBÞ > 0. Similarly for E(A|B).
To derive EðAjBÞ, from (21), two alternatives occur:
(a) P(Ac ^ B) = max{(1 + d) P(Ac ^ B)  d, 0} = 0. Hence EðAjBÞ ¼ 1.
(b) max{(1 + d)P(Ac ^ B)  d, 0} > 0. This happens iff PðAc ^ BÞ > d1þd ¼ s and implies min{(1 + d)P(A ^ B), 1} < 1 (otherwise
PðA ^ BÞP 11þd and PðBÞ > ddþ1þ 11þd ¼ 1). Hence we get EðAjBÞ ¼ ð1þdÞPðA^BÞð1þdÞðPðA^BÞþPðAc^BÞÞd ¼ PðA^BÞPðBÞs.
The derivation of E(A|B) is analogous:
(a) If P(A ^ B) = max{(1 + d)P(A ^ B)  d, 0} = 0, E(A|B) = 0.
(b) If max{(1 + d)P(A ^ B)  d, 0} > 0, this implies s < P(A ^ B) and min{(1 + d)P(Ac ^ B), 1} < 1; then EðAjBÞ ¼ PðA^BÞsPðBÞs .
Table 1 lists the values of PðAÞ, P(A), EðAjBÞ, E(A|B). They are written as functions of s, to simplify the inequalities in the ‘if’
clauses (referring to d, the clauses involve ratios of probabilities instead of probabilities). Note that the expressions for EðAjBÞ,
E(A|B) reduce to those for PðAÞ, P(A) when B =X.
5.1. Dilation and imprecision increase
How does imprecision in the evaluations vary when conditioning in the PMM model? To supply some answers, we ﬁrst
recall two concepts.
Table 1
Values of PðAÞ, P(A), EðAjBÞ, E(A|B).
PðAÞ ¼
PðAÞ
1s if s < PðAcÞ
1 if sP PðAcÞ
(
PðAÞ ¼
PðAÞs
1s if s < PðAÞ
0 if sP PðAÞ
(
EðAjBÞ ¼
PðA^BÞ
PðBÞs if s < PðAc ^ BÞ
1 if sP PðAc ^ BÞ
(
EðAjBÞ ¼
PðA^BÞs
PðBÞs if s < PðA ^ BÞ
0 if sP PðA ^ BÞ
8><>:
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while there is an imprecision increase whenPðAÞ  PðAÞ 6 PðAjBÞ  PðAjBÞ; 8B 2 P: ð23Þ
Dilation is a so far little investigated phenomenon (see [8,14]), which implies that our a posteriori opinions on A will be
vaguer and hence alsomore imprecise (at least in a weak sense, if the ﬁrst or last weak inequalities in (22) are equalities) than
the a priori ones, no matter which B 2 P is true. Even though dilation is P-dependent (so that we may hope that a well-cho-
sen partition P avoids dilation), it is a puzzling phenomenon. Clearly, dilation implies the weaker concept of imprecision in-
crease, which captures one of the two basic features of dilation, the growth in the degree of imprecision.
To discuss the occurrence of dilation or imprecision increase in the PMM, we assume that the conditional imprecise prob-
abilities on each A|B are the natural extensions EðAjBÞ, E(A|B) in Table 1. In this way we obtain the (W-coherent) natural
extension of P (or its conjugate P) on D [ fAjB : B 2 Pg, cf. the Appendix in [11]. As for partition P, our prior assumption
P(B) > 0, 8B 2 P, being equivalent by (2) to P(B) > s, 8B 2 P, implies that P is ﬁnite. Removing this restriction would lead
to versions of the following results formally, but not operationally more general. This is because conditioning the PMM prob-
abilities on the events of a partition Pmay produce non-vacuous and non-trivial results only for ﬁnitely many B 2 P. In fact,
there is a ﬁnite number of B such that P(B) > s for a given s, while when P(B) 6 s then P(B) = 0 and the PMM natural extension
on A|B is either trivial or vacuous by Lemma 1.
We present now a number of results concerning dilation.
Proposition 10. Let P, P be deﬁned by the PMM on a ﬁeld of events D and let E(A|B), EðAjBÞ be the corresponding natural
extensions on A|B, with B 2 P. Then,EðAjBÞ 6 PðAÞ iff PðAc ^ BcÞ ¼ 0 or sP PðA ^ BÞ  PðAÞPðBÞ
PðAc ^ BcÞ ; ð24Þ
EðAjBÞP PðAÞ iff PðA ^ BcÞ ¼ 0 or sP PðAÞPðBÞ  PðA ^ BÞ
PðA ^ BcÞ : ð25ÞRemark 2. At most one of the two weak inequalities in (24) and (25) has to be checked, since the signs of the numerators of
the fractional terms are opposite and s > 0.Proposition 11. In the PMM, deﬁne: ML = 0 if PðAc ^ BcÞ ¼ 0 8B 2 P, ML ¼ max PðA^BÞPðAÞPðBÞPðAc^BcÞ : B 2 P; PðAc ^ BcÞ – 0
n o
otherwise;
MU = 0, if PðA ^ BcÞ ¼ 0 8B 2 P, MU ¼ max PðAÞPðBÞPðA^BÞPðA^BcÞ : B 2 P; PðA ^ BcÞ– 0
n o
otherwise; M = max{ML, MU}. Then dilation occurs
if and only if sPM.Proof. (22) holds iff both (24) and (25) hold 8B 2 P, i.e. iff sPM. h
Proposition 11 fully solves the problem of characterising dilation for the natural extension of the PMM. Yet there are some
interesting sufﬁcient conditions for dilation, given in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Dilation occurs in the PMM for any s 2 ]0;1[, if either of the following conditions holds:
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ðbÞ P is uniform on P ¼ fB1; . . . ;Bng and P(A ^ Bi) = k > 0 (i = 1, . . . ,n).Proof. Condition (a) ensures dilation, as it implies M = 0 in Proposition 11. As for (b), it implies PðBiÞ ¼ 1n, PðA ^ BiÞ ¼ PðAÞn and
therefore condition (a). h
Note that the conditions in Corollary 2 are independent of s and that like other models, including the TVM and the e-con-
tamination model [8], non-correlation under P between A and each B 2 P causes dilation.
Concerning imprecision increase, the following sufﬁcient condition holds:
Proposition 12. Imprecision increases if (s <min{P(A ^ B),P(Ac ^ B)} or sPmax{P(A ^ B),P(Ac ^ B)}), 8B 2 P.Proof. Check that (23) holds, using Table 1. h
In the special case of Proposition 12 that sPmax{P(A ^ B),P(Ac ^ B)}, 8B 2 P, dilation is ensured too, but the inferences
via natural extension are trivial. See Example 3 for a non-trivial case of equivalence between dilation and imprecision
increase.
5.2. Imprecision variation in practice
Since Proposition 11 characterises dilation in the PMM, we just have to checkwhether its condition sPM applies or not to
shape dilation in any practical problem. Thematter is less immediatewith imprecision increase, when it is not already implied
by dilation: only the sufﬁcient condition in Proposition 12 is available. As a general remark, this kind of investigation should
distinguish more cases, according to the relative orderings in [0;1] of P(A ^ B), P(Ac ^ B), 8B 2 P, and s. However, the impor-
tance of each case varies greatly in the applications.We supply some results for themost signiﬁcant ones, while the remaining
may be analyzed using Table 1 to check (23), as demonstrated in Example 4. Consider then the following situations:
(a) the commission s is ‘low’;
(b) event A is ‘rare’.
Case (a) is probably the most important: s will often be rather low, recalling that it has the meaning of a commission or
taxation (this happens for instance with Internet betting). If ‘low’ means that s <M, dilation does not occur by Proposition 11.
However, and perhaps surprisingly, imprecision increases if s is ‘too low’, meaning with this that s < min{P(A ^ B),P(Ac ^ B)},
8B 2 P. In fact, the ‘if’ condition in Proposition 12 is true under this assumption, which also tends to rule out case (b).
We do not necessarily meet case (a) when P(A) is smaller than the commission s in favour of House or of an insurer (this is
relatively frequent in non-life insurance). In such instances, the study of imprecision increase is typically split into a number
of sub-cases, cf. Example 4 later on.
An important instance is that of rare or extremal events [6], a basic concept in several applications such as large insurance
claims, stock market shocks, climate phenomena, and so on. It corresponds to case (b). We present a simple, although com-
mon situation of this kind in Example 3. Here, like Example 4, the partition of conditioning events P ¼ fB;Bcg is binary.
Example 3. Suppose that A is ‘rare’, while Ac ^ B, Ac ^ Bc are not. Thus we may assume that P(A) 6 s < min{P(Ac ^ B),
P(Ac ^ Bc)}. Then (see Table 1) PðAÞ ¼ PðAÞ=ð1 sÞ; EðAjBÞ ¼ PðA ^ BÞ=ðPðBÞ  sÞ; EðAjBcÞ ¼ PðA ^ BcÞ=ðPðBcÞ  sÞ; EðAjBÞ ¼
EðAjBcÞ ¼ PðAÞ ¼ 0. Substituting these values into (22) and (23), we see that the inequalities in (22) are the same as those
in (23). That is, in this case, there is dilation iff there is imprecision increase. We may then apply Proposition 11 to determine
both by computing M, or just MU in this example. In fact M =MU since condition sPML ensures that
max{E(A|B),E(A|Bc)} 6 P(A) holds, which we already know to be trivially true in the form 0 = 0. For instance, if P(A) = 0.02,
P(A ^ B) = 0.005, P(A ^ Bc) = 0.015, P(B) = 0.4, we obtain MU ¼ 15 (and ML ¼ 3395 < PðAÞ 6 s), thus there is dilation (and
imprecision increase) for s such that 0.2 6 s < 0.395 = min{P(Ac ^ B),P(Ac ^ Bc)}, none of them for s 2 [0.02;0.2[.Example 4. Assign P as follows: PðA ^ BÞ ¼ 110 ; PðA ^ BcÞ ¼ PðAc ^ BcÞ ¼ 15 ; PðAc ^ BÞ ¼ 12. Consequently PðAÞ ¼ 310 ; PðBÞ ¼ 35 ;
PðAjBÞ ¼ 16 ; PðAjBcÞ ¼ 12. To study dilation for the corresponding PMM using Proposition 11, we calculate D ¼ PðA ^ BcÞ
PðAÞPðBcÞ ¼ PðAÞPðBÞ  PðA ^ BÞ ¼ 225 > 0;ML ¼ DPðAc^BÞ ¼ 425 ;MU ¼ DPðA^BcÞ ¼ 25. Therefore, Proposition 11 guarantees that dilation
occurs iff sPmaxfML;MUg ¼ 25.
As for imprecision increase, it is ensured by Proposition 12 when s < 110 or sP
1
2, but in the latter case we already know
that dilation, and hence imprecision increase as well, occurs for sP 25. For s 2 ½ 110 ; 25 ½, we have to check whether the
inequalities (23) hold, distinguishing more subcases according to the different expressions for PðAÞ; PðAÞ; EðAjBÞ;
EðAjBÞ; EðAjBcÞ; EðAjBcÞ. Conditioning on Bc, we should check whetherEðAjBcÞ  EðAjBcÞP PðAÞ  PðAÞ: ð26Þ
1156 R. Pelessoni et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 1145–1158Now, EðAjBcÞ  EðAjBcÞ ¼ 1 and (26) therefore holds if s 2 ½15 ; 25 ½, while (26) specialises into sPðBcÞsP s1s when s 2 ½ 110 ; 15 ½, and
this inequality is true. Therefore (26) is veriﬁed for s 2 ½ 110 ; 25 ½, and imprecision increase in this interval depends only on
whether the inequality EðAjBÞ  EðAjBÞP PðAÞ  PðAÞ holds. Noting that EðAjBÞ  EðAjBÞ ¼ PðA^BÞPðBÞs ¼ 1610s ;8s 2 ½ 110 ; 25 ½, we have
to check whether:1
610sP
PðAÞ
1s ¼ 310ð1sÞ if s 2 ½ 310 ; 25 ½
1
610sP
s
1s if s 2 ½ 110 ; 310 ½:The former inequality has no solution in ½ 310 ; 25 ½, the latter is true for s 2 110 ; 15
 
. Conclusions: dilation occurs iff s 2 ½25 ;1½, impre-
cision increase but not dilation iff s 20; 15, neither of them iff s 2 15 ; 25 ½.5.3. Imprecision variation and partition reﬁnement
Limiting dilation or imprecision increase in the PMM is not straightforward. This may be achieved by an appropriate
choice of s in some, but not all cases (for instance, s 2 ½15 ; 25 ½ might be too high a percentage in Example 4). More generally,
an obvious alternative is to choose a coherent extension other than the natural extension. This often shrinks imprecision, by
the dominance properties of the natural extension, but ﬁnding a computationally simple such extension may be not so easy
in practice.
In [8] the following interpretation for dilation is outlined: one may think that P(A|B) (PðAjBÞ) is the lower (upper) enve-
lope of a set of precise probabilities, each representing the opinion of a single expert, and that P(A|B) 6 P(A) and
PðAjBÞP PðAÞ because there is disagreement among the experts about the effect of observing B on the probability of A. This
suggests that we might reﬁne the starting partition P, for instance splitting B into B1 _ B2 . . . _ Bm, Bi ^ Bj = ; if i – j, such
that there is a larger consensus on the effect of each Bi on A. Intuitively, reﬁning the partition of the conditioning events
should hinder dilation, since the number of constraints in Proposition 10 increases. One might expect a decrease in impre-
cision too, but this cannot be taken for sure. To give an idea of the situation, consider the special case that A) B1 ) B. If a
dF-coherent precise probability P is assessed on the relevant conditional events, it is well known that P(A|B1)P(B1|B) =
P(A|B), hence P(A|B1)P P(A|B): uncertainty decreases (or does not increase, at least) when conditioning in a narrower envi-
ronment. What happens in the same case, if P is replaced by imprecise probabilities? The next proposition gives the
answer:
Proposition 13. Let A) B1 ) B, and let P (P) be a W-coherent upper (lower) probability, such that the expressions below are well
deﬁned. ThenPðAjB1ÞP PðAjBÞ; ð27Þ
PðAjB1ÞP PðAjBÞ: ð28ÞFrom Proposition 13, introducing a more reﬁned partition has an upward shift effect on the conditional imprecise prob-
abilities concerning A. While this tends to make dilation more difﬁcult, but not necessarily impossible (note that the shift in
(28) tends to reduce dilation, or even to prevent it if such that P(A|B1) > P(A)), the overall effect on imprecision variation is
unsure (the shift in (27) tends to increase it), and it is possible that PðAjB1Þ  PðAjB1Þ > PðAjBÞ  PðAjBÞ. Outside the case
A) B1, formulae less direct than (27) and (28) apply, but analogous conclusions may be drawn.6. Conclusions
The pari-mutuel model represents a simple and natural way of eliciting upper and lower probabilities, and can be ex-
tended in more directions, thanks to the availability of standard procedures for 2-monotone and 2-alternating previsions.
We computed explicitly its natural extension E starting from a PMM assignment on a lattice of events, generalizing the ap-
proach in [16], which is anyway discussed, focusing on comparing the different formulae available for E. While a naive exten-
sion, considered in insurance premium pricing, does not seem to be a valuable alternative to the natural extension, being
generally not coherent, the various formulae for the natural extension have a notable meaning in risk measurement. In fact,
they correspond to known measures of risk or generalize them. We discussed also how to use the natural extension when
conditioning, characterising dilation and investigating imprecision increase for the PMM.
A tempting new direction would, in a sense, merge our analysis in the conditional and unconditional framework, studying
the natural extension to conditional gambles. Here a difﬁculty arises: available generalizations of equations (21), studied in
[12], are lower/upper bounds for the natural extension and might not be attained, even when P is 2-alternating. In other
words, the available procedures seem to give weaker results.
This and the considerations in Section 5.3 on how to limit dilation or imprecision increase might motivate investigating
coherent extensions of the PMM alternative to the natural extension.
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Appendix A. Proofs of the main results
Proof of Proposition 6. By Proposition 3 (a), EðBÞ ¼ PðBÞ ¼ inffminfð1þ dÞPðAÞ;1g : A 2 Sþ;B) Ag. Deﬁning LB = {A 2 S+:
B) A, (1 + d)P(A) < 1}, LB =£ iff ð1þ dÞePðBÞP 1.
Two cases may occur: if LB =£, that is if ð1þ dÞePðBÞP 1, then EðBÞ ¼ 1; if LB–£, that is if ð1þ dÞePðBÞ < 1,
EðBÞ ¼ inffð1þ dÞPðAÞ : A 2 LBg ¼ ð1þ dÞ inffPðAÞ : A 2 LBg ¼ ð1þ dÞePðBÞ. In summary, Eq. (15) holds. h
Proof of Proposition 7. Apply (4) and Proposition 3 (a) substituting P ¼ E with its expression in Eq. (15), getting6 Rec
7 Wh
EP XjX
EðXÞ ¼ inf X þ
Z supX
inf X
minfð1þ dÞePðX > xÞ;1gdx: ð29Þ
From here, the derivation of (16) is similar to that just sketched in [16, Section 3.2.5], to obtain (6). We detail the proof here
for the sake of completeness. Since x < xus (alternatively x > x
u
s) implies ePðX > xÞP 1 s ¼ 11þd (alternativelyePðX > xÞ < 11þd), we get from (29)EðXÞ ¼ inf X þ
Z xus
inf X
dxþ ð1þ dÞ
Z sup X
xus
ePðX > xÞdx ¼ xus þ ð1þ dÞZ sup X
xus
ePðX > xÞdx: ð30Þ
We prove now that EPððX  xusÞþÞ ¼
R supX
xus
ePðX > xÞdx. For this, we apply Proposition 3 to the coherent, 2-alternating (upper)
probability eP. Since inf X  xus þ ¼ 0 and sup X  xus þ ¼ supX  xus , as ensues using also a property analogous to Proposi-
tion 4 (b), and since, for xP 0, X  xus
 þ
> x iff X  xus > x, we getEPððX  xusÞþÞ ¼
Z supXxus
0
ePðX  xus > xÞdx ¼ Z sup X
xus
ePðX > xÞdx;
where integration by substitution is employed in the last equality. hProof of Proposition 8. Noting that X  xus
 þ ¼ X  xus IX>xus and by subadditivity of coherent upper previsions and, at the
second equality, the GBR,6,7 EP

X  xus
 þ ¼ EP X  xus IX>xus  6 EP IX>xus X  EP XjX > xus  Þ þ EP IX>xus EP XjX > xus  xus   ¼
EP IX>xus EP XjX > xus
  xus   ¼ EP IX>xus  EP XjX > xus  xus  ¼def k.
Using also the deﬁnition of eu and k, we get further xus þ ð1þ dÞk ¼ xus 1 ð1þ dÞEP X > xus
  þ ð1þ dÞ kþ xusEP X > xus Þ
¼ euxus þ ð1þ dÞ EP X > xus
 
EP XjX > xus
  xus þ xusEP X > xus   ¼ euxus þ ð1 euÞEP XjX > xus .
Finally, by (16) and the expressions above, EðXÞ ¼ xus þ ð1þ dÞEP

X xus
 þ6 xus þ ð1þ dÞk¼ euxus þ ð1 euÞEP XjX >ð xusÞ. hProof of Proposition 10. To prove (24), we use Table 1 to choose the appropriate values of E, P and substitute them into
E(A|B) 6 P(A).
If s < P(A ^ B), E(A|B) 6 P(A) becomes PðA^BÞsPðBÞs 6 PðAÞs1s , which, with simple calculations and recalling the well-known
inclusion–exclusion principle P(A _ B) + P(A ^ B) = P(A) + P(B), is easily seen to be equivalent to P(A ^ B)  P(A)P(B) 6
sP(Ac ^ Bc). When P(Ac ^ Bc) = 0, this inequality is satisﬁed for any value of s, since, in this case, P(A ^ B)  P(A)P(B) = P(A) +
P(B)  1  P(A)P(B) = (1  P(B))(P(A)  1) 6 0 (use the inclusion–exclusion principle again in the ﬁrst equality). Otherwise, it
is clearly satisﬁed for sP PðA^BÞPðAÞPðBÞPðAc^BcÞ .
When sP P(A ^ B), the inequality E(A|B) 6 P(A) is trivially satisﬁed. To conclude the proof of (24), we observe that, when
P(Ac ^ Bc) > 0, some algebraic calculations show that PðA^BÞPðAÞPðBÞPðAc^BcÞ 6 PðA ^ BÞ.
The proof of (25) is analogous. hProof of Proposition 13. We start by establishing (27). When P is a W-coherent upper prevision, X a gamble, C an event and
IC its indicator, the following inequality holds:all also that the natural extension EP always exists with W-coherence, cf. [11].
en EP X > xus
  ¼ 0, there is an inﬁnite number of possible values satisfying the GBR. In this case, it can be proved that any of them can replace
> xus

in Proposition 8.
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Inequality (31) can be proven in a way quite analogue to the proof of the opposite inequality for lower previsions given in
[12, Proposition 3.1 (a)]. Putting C = B1, X = A, (31) specialises into PðAjBÞ 6 PðB1jBÞPðAjB1Þ, which implies (27).
Now we consider (28). We use the deﬁnition of W-coherence (Deﬁnition 1 in Section 2) to show that (28) is necessary to
ensure sup G|BP 0, for a speciﬁc G obtained from betting on A|B, A|B1 with stakes 1, 1, respectively. In fact, using
IB ¼ IB1 þ IBIBc1 at the second equality,G ¼ IBðA PðAjBÞÞ  IB1 ðA PðAjB1ÞÞ ¼ IB1 ðA PðAjBÞÞ þ IBIBc1 ðA PðAjBÞÞ  IB1 ðA PðAjB1ÞÞ
¼ IB1 ðPðAjB1Þ  PðAjBÞÞ þ IBIBc1 ðA PðAjBÞÞ:Then, G|B has only two possible values: G|B = P(A|B1)  P(A|B) when B1 and B are true, G|B = P(A|B) 6 0 when B1 is false
and B is true.
Hence (28) holds, trivially when P(A|B) = 0, to guarantee that sup G|BP 0, when P(A|B) > 0. hReferences
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